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Petitioning and Responding under the Escape
Clause: One Practitioner's View
on How to Do It
by R. Christian Berg*
I. Introduction
The conventional wisdom distinguishes between two types of import
competition: that which is "fair," and that which is "unfair.", The so-
called "escape clause"2 is the principal U.S. statute concerned with regu-
lation of "fair" import competition. Through this statute a beleaguered
industry suffering from excessive but otherwise "fair" import competition
may seek a temporary respite during which it is expected to introduce
reforms to improve its competitive abilities. 3
The objective of this article is to outline the "how to" aspects of
petitioning and responding under the escape clause. For the practitioner
unfamiliar with the highly politicized environment in which trade policy
decisions are formulated under the escape clause, a brief description of
the underlying economic theories and the decision-making process is a
useful predicate to a discussion of the practical aspects of the lawyer's
role.
A. The Underlying Economic Theoy
Prevailing economic theory holds that achievement of unfettered in-
ternational trade will provide long term benefits to all participants, pri-
marily through maximization of what economists refer to as comparative
advantage.4 However, a corollary is that, as patterns of import competi-
tion change with the reduction of barriers to trade, in any individual
* Partner, Harris, Berg & Creskoff, Washington, D.C.; B.A. 1962, University of Maine;
J.D. 1972, George Washington University.'
I The validity of this distinction has been questioned. See Hearings on the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 703
(1979) (testimony of Noel Hemmendinger).
2 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 5, 13, 19, 26, 28, 31 U.S.C. (1976)).
3 Report of the Senate Committee on Finance on the Trade Reform Act of 1974, S. REP. No. 1298,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 119 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
4 There is extensive literature on the economic theory pertaining to the effects of trade
barrier reductions. A useful starting point for those wishing to gain greater understanding is
Chapter 1 of J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS
(1977).
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economy there may be harmful (albeit temporary) dislocations among
labor and capital in specific sectors. The literature refers to these disloca-
tions as part of the "adjustment" process, and for decades there has been
an unending debate among economists, politicans, and officialdom as to
the ways and means through which society should allocate these transi-
tional burdens of adjustment to the new order.5
United States policies on international trade issues, as reflected in
the ongoing Trade Agreements Program, 6 have explicitly sought to
achieve the benefits which economic theory teaches will come from
"freer" trade. 7 Since the early 1940's, U.S. policies aimed at promoting
international trade consistently have recognized the need for assistance
to domestic interests adversely affected by changed patterns of import
competition.8 Since 1951 governmental assistance in the adjustment pro-
cess has been provided through statute.9 Notwithstanding the pro-com-
petitive emphasis of the antitrust laws and of general trade policies, the
escape clause has become the linchpin in a series of legislated exceptions
to the otherwise consistent congressional efforts to promote vigorous
competition.
B. The Import Relief Process Under the Escape Clause
An escape clause proceeding is commenced upon petition "by an
entity . . . which is representative of an industry,"' 0 "[u]pon the request
of the President or the United States Trade Representative, upon resolu-
tion of either the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Committee on Finance of the Senate. . .", or upon the
motion of the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC).II
Escape clause proceedings are conducted in two phases: an investi-
5 Stern, Tart# and Other Measures of Trade Control. A Sumey of Recent Developments, 11 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 857 (1973), provides a review of arguments on the issue and affords a com-
prehensive, if somewhat dated, list of pertinent citations to primary sources.
6 See Kelly, Antecedents of Present Commercial Policy, 1922-1934, in STUDIES IN UNITED
STATES COMMERCIAL POLICY 3-68 (W. Kelly ed. 1963).
7 Congressional consideration of the philosophical basis for the distinction between "free"
trade and "freer" trade appears to have emerged in the 1945 congressional debates over whether
the United States should become a party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT); see 91 CONG. REC. 4871 (1945) (remarks of Rep. Doughton); Hearings on the Extension of
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act Before the Senate Finance Comm., 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 84, 86, 90,
179-80, 459 (1945); Hearings on the Extension of the Reciorocal Trade Agreements Act Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 273 (1945).
8 The concept of "escaping" from trade agreements, for purposes of providing temporary
assistance in overcoming problems caused by resulting changes in trade patterns, first appeared
in the Reciprocal Trade Agreement with Mexico, Dec. 23, 1942, 57 Stat. 833, E.A.S. No. 311
(effective Jan. 30, 1943).
9 See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-50, 65 Stat. 72 (current
version at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1976)).
10 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1976).
1 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1) (Supp. III 1979). For a recent, detailed critical analysis of the
escape clause provision, see GAO REP., CHANGES NEEDED IN ADMINISTERING RELIEF TO IN-
DUSTRIES HURT BY OVERSEAS COMPETITION, ID-81-42 (August 5, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
GAO Report].
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gative phase to establish facts and recommend remedies; and a decision
phase which is the responsibility of the President. The first phase, to be
accomplished within six months of the date the petition is filed (or the
date on which the request or resolution is received or the motion is
adopted),' 12 is conducted by the ITC acting as an independent fact find-
ing and policy recommending arm of the Congress.13
The ITC is a unique institution composed of six commissioners ap-
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 4
The Commission has at its disposal a sizable staff composed of trained
commodity analysts, attorneys, accountants, statisticians, economists,
and clerical personnel. In escape clause proceedings the Commission
functions in an investigative capacity in determining facts, and in an
advisory capacity in recommending appropriate forms of relief.' 5
Through its staff, the Commission distributes detailed questionnaires to
producers, importers, wholesalers, and retailers, and develops a large
body of information on the workings of the whole economic sector under
investigation. 16
The Commission also conducts public hearings where presentations
are received on the record and under oath. During these hearings any
interested party is free to provide the Commission with the benefit of its
information and opinion. While cross-examination is allowed to all par-
ticipants, neither the conventional rules of evidence and procedure, nor
the Administrative Procedures Act, 17 are applicable. To the novice,
these hearings give the appearance of a trial, but appearances are deceiv-
ing. These hearings are not adversarial proceedings, and the Commission
is more or less free to collect whatever information it considers relevant in
whatever fashion it deems appropriate. All interested parties are free to
submit prehearing briefs, and posthearing briefs based in whole or in
part on the transcript of hearings whether or not they have been partici-
pants in these hearings. Such briefs may be submitted in confidence in
accordance with the ITC rules.'8
Upon conclusion of its investigation the Commission reaches deter-
minations on the statutory issues, votes on the questions of injury and the
forms of relief to be recommended, and publishes an extensive written
report including opinions from individual Commissioners as well as de-
tailed factual appendices prepared by the staff.
It is important to understand that the Commission has the statutory
12 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(2) (1976).
13 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 115.
14 19 U.S.C. § 13 30(a) (1976).
15 Senate Report, supra note 3, at 115.
16 See GAO Report, supra note 11, for a more detailed discussion of ITC procedures.
17 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
18 19 C.F.R. § 201.6 (1980). Recently the ITC has sought to impose requirements for
prehearing conferences and briefs, and to limit the scope of post hearing briefs. See Fishing
Rods and Parts Thereof, 46 Fed. Reg. 39,914 (1981).
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mandate and obligation to reach a determination, but it has a broad
discretion as to ways and means. For instance, it is not bound to ex-
amine a trade on the terms defined by a petitioner. It can and often has
examined imports and their competitive effect on broader or narrower
grounds than those urged by private parties.
Another important point is that, as an investigative body, prior find-
ings of the Commission have little precedential value.' 9 Similarly, in the
author's view, thorough court review is probably unattainable since ITC
decisions are only advisory in nature.20
The second phase of escape clause proceedings, to be accomplished
within sixty days after receipt of an affirmative ITC report, 2 ' is the re-
sponsibility of the President acting independently but with the counsel of
Executive Branch advisors and interested public parties. 22 The President
is required to provide relief for an industry found to be seriously injured
within the meaning of the statute "unless he determines that provision of
such relief is not in the national economic interest of the United States
) .;23 in practical fact, this language of exception allows the President
broad discretion not to restrict imports if the balance of power among
domestic political interests either is neutral or alliable on the side of no
restrictions.
If the President refuses to impose the relief recommended by the
ITC, or imposes relief in a form different from that recommended, he
must report to the Congress his reasons in terms of the national economic
interest.24 Within ninety legislative days of the President's determina-
tion, 25 the Congress may force into effect the original recommendations
of the ITC through adoption of a concurrent resolution of disapproval.2 6
Parties seeking relief under the escape clause must understand from
the outset several key aspects of these proceedings. First, relief is "tempo-
rary" in that protection from excessive import competition may be in
19 From time to time some Commissioners have cited opinions in past cases as establishing
the meaning of certain statutory phrases and the intent of Congress. Recently, opinions in
escape clause cases have shown an increasing tendency by some of the present Commissioners to
cite their prior opinions as to the meaning of specific statutory phrases. See Mushrooms, Inv.
No. TA-201-43, USITC Pub. No. 1089 (August 1980) and Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain
Chasis and Bodies Therefor, Inv. No. TA-201-44, USITC Pub. No. 1110 (December 1980). It is
problematic whether other Commissioners in the future will abide by what their predecessors
have concluded in these matters.
20 Cf. Sneaker Circus, Inc. v. Carter, 457 F. Supp. 771, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afld, 614 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1979) (ITC determination of "good cause" to order a reinvestigation not review-
able except where arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion).
21 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1976).
22 Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 242, 76 Stat. 872 (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1872 (Supp. 111 1979)).
23 19 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(I)(A) (1976).
24 Id. § 2253 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
25 Id. § 2253(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
26 Id. See also Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1801(b)(2), 90 Stat. 1520
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(2) (1976).
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effect for a maximum of only eight years.27 Second, at least in the past,
decisions to provide relief have more often than not reflected the degree
of domestic political power mustered by the petitioners. Whether this
factor will change in the future is problematic; given the statutory
scheme, which promotes politicization of the decision-making process, a
significant change in this factor seems unlikely. Third, escape clause pro-
ceedings are complicated blends of legal and economic argument, polit-
ical lobbying, and public relations campaigning. While they are
necessarily expensive if properly planned and executed, these proceed-
ings, if successful, are a sound business investment for petitioners willing
to carry out the commitment to accomplish adjustment to the new com-
petitive environment brought about by increased "fair" import competi-
tion. These three factors should guide the respondent with the caveat
that a series of uncoordinated responses from interests representing di-
verse import sources is tantamount to being divided at the start of battle.
Escape clause proceedings present an uncommon challenge for the
attorney. The practitioner in these cases is cast in a role having closer
parallels in theatre than jurisprudence. The attorney is more than a
mere technician and advocate; he or she is simultaneously the director of
a theatrical production and a general in the heat of battle. Flexibility
and pragmatism are as important as technical competency and skill in
advocacy.
II. The Statutory Issues
Section 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 requires that the ITC
"determine whether an article is being imported into the United States
in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury,
or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article like
or directly competitive with the imported article."'28
The term "like or directly competitive article" is not defined on the
face of the statute. However, the supporting legislative history states
the words 'like' and 'directly competitive,' as used . . . in this bill, are
not to be regarded as synonymous or explanatory of each other, but
rather distinguish between 'like' articles and articles which, although not
'like' are nevertheless 'directly competitive.' In such context, 'like' arti-
cles are those which are substantially identical in inherent or intrinsic
characteristics (i.e., materials from which made, appearance, quality,
texture, etc.), and 'directly competitive' articles are those which, al-
though not substantially identical in their inherent or intrinsic charac-
teristics, are substantially equivalent for commercial purposes, that is, are
adapted to the same uses and are essentially interchangeable therefore. 2 9
27 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a), (h) (1976 & Supp. IIl 1979).
28 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 2, § 201(b)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
29 Report of the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, H.R. REP.
No. 571, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 121-22 (emphasis added).
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Section 201(b)(4) 30 of the Act defines the term "substantial cause"
as one "which is important and not less than any other cause." The
legislative history of this section points out that this is a two part test:
increased imports must be both an important cause of serious injury and
one which is not less important than any other single cause. 3' Further,
the Act provides that the Commission, in reaching its determinations re-
garding import-caused serious injury, "shall take into account all eco-
nomic factors which it considers relevant including. . . , with respect to
substantial cause an increase in imports (either actual or relative to domestic
production) and a decline in the proportion of the domestic market sup-
plied by domestic producers."'32
The analysis regarding injury called for by the Act is with respect to
the domestic industry producing an article like or directly competitive
with the imported article. This is important because the definition of rele-
vant industry and the examination of data respecting injury and causal-
ity are, in effect, determined by the definition of the imported product.
Specific indicia of injury include "significant idling of productive facili-
ties . . . the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
reasonable level of profit, and significant unemployment or underem-
ployment within the industry . . . . -33 Specified indicia of threatened
serious injury include declines in sales; higher and growing inventory;
and a downward trend in production, profits, wages, employment, or in-
creasing underemployment. 34 However, the existence of any or all of
these indicia is not determinative of a case; injury must have been substan-
tially caused by increased imports of the like or directly competitive
product.
III. The ITC Determination
A. Considerations for the Petitioner's Counsel
For counsel to a domestic entity seeking import relief, the choice of
statutory vehicles necessarily begins with an examination of market and
business facts. As with conventional legal problems, the lawyer's prelimi-
nary objective is to apply these facts to the law in order to determine
which of the several statutory routes to relief might be available. While
budgetary or political considerations might dictate the ultimate choice of
statutory routes, the initial responsibility of the practitioner is to deter-
mine whether a case for relief exists within the terms of the statute.
35
30 Trade Act of 1974,supra note 2, § 201(b)(4) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1976)).
' House Report, supra note 29, at 46; Senate Report, supra note 3, at 120.
32 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).
33 Id. § 2251(b)(2)(A) (1976).
34 Id. § 2251(b)(2)(B) (1976).
35 Throughout this article the author has assumed the practitioner will gain at least a
passing familiarity with the terms of the statute and its supporting legislative history. An article
of the sort here presented cannot adequately deal with the multitude of provisions contained in
Title II of the 1974 Act, nor can it delve into every nuance of statutory construction.
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If the escape clause is chosen as the appropriate vehicle, a further
point to bear in mind, in preparing both the petition and the oral testi-
mony for presentation to the Commission, is that the ITC phase of a case
is ideally a careful blend of facts, law, and theatre. It has long been a
matter of conjecture among practitioners experienced in these cases
whether the public hearings conducted by the ITC are of much value.
Most have concluded that the public hearings present an invaluable op-
portunity to "flesh out" the numbers collected by the ITC staff.3 6 Often,
the data alone make out a cogent case for relief. However, the introduc-
tion of testimony by business people, who for years have garnered their
livelihood from the trade under examination, can throw a totally differ-
ent light on the numbers. Commissioners on the ITC ordinarily prefer to
question participants in the trade rather than their attorneys, and the job
of prudent counsel is to carefully orchestrate a full revelation of the reali-
ties of doing business in the trade being examined. Too often in past
cases counsel have allowed emotional rhetoric to supplant hard logic and
facts. "Floods" of imports can be explained by "management incompe-
tence," but counsel on both sides should bear in mind that the members
of the Commission are not impressed by mere simplistic, self-serving as-
sertions of cause and effect.
In short, the public hearings present an opportunity to personally
impress individual Commissioners, as well as the influential staff, with
the realities of competition in the business world. Thoroughness in prep-
aration by counsel allows for candid presentations by knowledgeable wit-
nesses; there is never a clear cut case under the terms of the escape clause.
Three principal statutory issues are raised under the escape clause.
These are the following:
1. Whether imports of a like or directly competitive product are in-
creasing within the meaning of the statute?
2. Whether the U.S. industry producing the competing products evi-
dences serious injury or the threat thereof? and,
3. Whether the actual or threatened serious injury is substantially
caused by the increased imports?
B. Defining the Like or Directly Competitive Imports
Hindsight has taught practitioners familiar with escape clause pro-
ceedings that product definition is perhaps the most crucial aspect of case
preparation. The statute and its supporting legislative history are rea-
sonably clear in meaning, but the outcome of several important cases has
turned nonetheless on differences of opinion over this issue, especially
36 On both sides of these cases, counsel are presented with an unusual opportunity. There
is in each of us a certain pretense to theatrical ability which, in the relatively free environment
of ITC public hearings, can lead to performances of widely varying quality. An effective pres-
entation before the Commission should contain elements of theatre, but never of circus. Credi-
bility and persuasiveness come from cogent and technically sound factual presentations, not
from rhetoric based on conjecture or speculation as to opponents' motives or from devious ma-
nipulation of economic data.
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with regard to the consequences of product definition on questions of
injury and causality. In one very important case, Non-Rubber Footwear,3 7
petitioners argued in effect that a shoe is a shoe and that data should be
aggregated accordingly. The Commission adopted this definition despite
cogent arguments from respondents that at a minimum women's foot-
wear could not be classed as interchangeable for end use with men's foot-
wear. The result was that a very large industry was found to be injured
within the meaning of the statute even though a strong case was made
that there was no injury in sectors such as the one producing men's
workboots.
The issue of product definition is, therefore, one to be approached
with great caution and forethought. In light of this, careful analysis of
data on injury and factors of market competition should be accom-
plished before product definition is solidified.
C Calculating Import Penetration
In many cases, determining import penetration levels is made virtu-
ally impossible by a paucity of data. A number of sources exist within
the federal government, depending on the product sector under exami-
nation. The Department of Commerce and its Bureau of the Census are
responsible for the collection of data on a wide variety of imports and
domestic production. The Department of Labor collects data on em-
ployment and wages. The Departments of Agriculture and Interior and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration are also valuable
resources for data on specific product sectors within their jurisdictions.
Often, the staff in congressional offices representing members of the
industry under examination will be helpful to the non-Washington prac-
titioner in locating sources of data within the federal bureaucracy. An
always invaluable source will be the ITC staff where commodity special-
ists spend their professional lives delving into the intricacies of trade in
discrete sectors.
In addition, trade associations in the private sector often collect de-
tailed data from members, but distribution is generally controlled. A
further problem is that data from such entities may be incomplete, either
because some producers are not reporting members, or because reports
from members are unverified. Trade publications may also provide lim-
ited data, although their accuracy may become an issue. Industry ex-
perts or private consultants often are able to provide reasonably accurate
approximations through a variety of estimating techniques applied to
general data encompassing the products of concern.
It should be borne in mind that the ITC generally examines statisti-
cal data going back at least four years preceding the year in which the
37 Inv. No. TA-201-7, USITC Pub. 758 (1976); Inv. No. TA-201-18, USITC Pub. 799
(1977).
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investigation is commenced. In some cases, the ITC will examine data
for five or more years.
If a search of all sources fails to develop product specific data, the
practitioner should resort to reasonable estimations based on the best
available information. Usually, petitioning companies will have avail-
able knowledgeable employees or consultants to assist in preparation of
estimates. The ITC has both the statutory responsibility and requisite
subpoena authority to obtain whatever data is necessary to reach its de-
terminations, 38 and a showing of conscientious but fruitless efforts to de-
velop data will generally be sufficient to gain acceptance of a petition
based on estimations, especially if the practitioner has established close
liaison with the ITC staff before filing the petition.
D. Developing Evidence of Serious Injut
Information pertinent to the issue of statutory injury will come pri-
marily from clients if they are the producing companies. Two principal
difficulties will arise in collection and analysis of these data. First, pro-
tecting the confidentiality of data from any one company raises ethical
questions under the attorney/client privilege as enunciated in Canon 4 of
the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility.3 9
Second, certain antitrust problems may arise for counsel especially with
regard to data on prices; counsel must avoid becoming a conduit of infor-
mation among competitors. The answers to the questions raised by these
issues are beyond the scope of this article, but one practical solution is to
have the clients collectively retain independent outside accountants to
receive and collate necessary information for use by counsel.
If the client is a union representing organized labor in the industry,
cooperation in providing data may be elicited from the employers under
appropriate guarantees of protection for confidential information. Fur-
ther, if the industry is composed primarily of publicly held companies,
periodic reports and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in Washington or analagous state agencies may prove to be ade-
quate sources. Once again, the ITC has the statutory responsibility to
determine the facts in the course of its investigation, and little more than
aprinafacie case is required in a petition, assuming that status as a repre-
sentative of the industry is established.
E. Demonstrating Requisite Causality
As pointed out above, "substantial cause" is defined in the statute as
"a cause which is important and not less than any other cause."' '  This is
a reasonably clear and understandable standard. The legislative history,
reflecting the tension between political forces on opposite philosophical
38 19 U.S.C. § 1333(c) (Supp. III 1979).
39 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4 (1975).
40 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1976).
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sides of the trade issue at the time of enactment, is somewhat more
ambivalent.
It is ordinarily impossible to qualify the degree to which any one
factor may have caused difficulties for an industry. Often, a domestic
industry will assert an almost ipso facto case on causality based merely
on the sheer volume of imports or the degree of market penetration. In
the extreme case, some credence may be given to this approach. How-
ever, high import penetration by itself does not demonstrate substantial
cause. It may well be, for instance, that the domestic industry producing
widgets has opted to import supplementary or complementary products
to market in conjunction with those produced domestically. Thus, im-
ports of widgets will have increased. Concurrently, the market for wid-
gets may have undergone severe contraction because a totally new
substitute product, the wizbang, produced solely in the United States by
other companies, has captured sales in excess of the volume lost by the
widget producers. Clearly, the shift in consumer preference from widgets
to wizbangs in this hypothetical case is quantifiable as a cause of greater
importance than the increased imports of widgets. 4 1
Absent data to quantify relative degrees of causality, demonstration
of requisite causality is ordinarily obtained through accumulation of
other indicies. While technically more relevant to dumping or subsidy
cases, evidence of import caused price depression, 42 price suppression, 43
and lost sales4 4 can be used to demonstrate substantial cause. In the or-
dinary case, documentary evidence, such as price comparisons based on
actual invoices or on affidavits from customers who have purchased com-
peting imports, when coupled with a mathematically shown correlation
to declining sales and profitability, can be developed into an empirical
demonstration of substantial cause. 45
The keys to development of a case on substantial cause are creativity
and technical precision. Ordinarily, the proof will begin with a thorough
exposition on all aspects of the production and marketing of the product;
industry experts in marketing, accounting, and production will provide
the raw material. The available facts, developed with creativity, will de-
41 Moreover, if the petitioners are representatives of labor, a neat issue is raised whether
"self-inflicted" injury to the "industry" is a proper basis for import restrictions, especially if the
result would be to accelerate the demise of the producing companies. The moral of this hypo-
thetical is that careful initial planning will identify potential opponents and likely outcome
before time and money are wasted. Parenthetically, this case also demonstrates the care which
must be taken in defining the "like or direct/y competitive" products, as discussed in text accompa-
nying note 38 supra.
42 Price depression is generally understood to mean a forcing down of prices to levels,
below that at which they had been set, in order to meet competition.
43 Price suppression is ordinarily understood to mean a holding down of prices, despite
inflation in costs.
44 Lost sales are generally understood to mean those taken from an established supplier,
usually on the basis of price disparity.
45 A recent and curious demonstration is found in the opinions of the Commissioners in
Certain Motor Vehicles, supra note 19.
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termine the course taken in the proof. Adherence to sound principles of
technical precision within the statutory framework will insure that the
case in chief does not lose credibility through an excess of theatrics.
F Describtng The Injutv
A presentation on the question of injury is generally best made with
the assistance of outside accountants or economic consultants. Few law-
yers possess the requisite technical skills to adequately develop raw data
into demonstrations of the more intricate factors in the proof of injury
such as sales/profit ratios. Similarly, few lawyers are equipped to draw
the kinds of conclusions from economic data that professionals in these
other fields are trained to develop.
Economists are also of great value in developing a case on
threatened serious injury where the emphasis is on the likely conse-
quences of continued unfettered import competition. Practitioners
should avoid relying on the conjecture of businessmen from the industry.
Self-serving cries of imminent doom carry little weight with the profes-
sional economists found both in the ITC staff and on the bench. The
practitioner's goal should be to present a technically sound estimate
which will ring true in the mind of a neutral professional economist.
. Deciding on the Remedy to be Requested
Section 201(d)(1) of the Act46 provides that
[i]f the Commission finds with respect to any article, as a result of its
investigation, the serious injury or threat thereof described in subsection
(b), it shall-(A) find the amount of the increase in, or imposition of,
any duty or import restriction on such article which is necessary to pre-
vent or remedy such injury or (B) if it determines that adjustment assist-
ance under chapters 2, 3, and 4 can effectively remedy such injury,
recommend the provision of such assistance, and shall include such find-
ings or recommendation in its report to the President. The Commission
shall furnish to the President a transcript of the hearings and any briefs
which were submitted in connection with each investigation.
Section 201(a)(1) 47 requires that the petition "include a statement
describing the specific purposes for which import relief is being sought,
which may include such objectives as facilitating the orderly transfer of
resources to alternative uses and other means of adjustment to new con-
ditions of competition."
Embodied in the practice that has developed at the ITC reflecting
these provisions is a requirement that petitioners specify both the form of
relief they desire and the actions they intend to take to accomplish ad-
justment if relief is given. The choice to be made is based largely on
business judgments.4 8
46 Trade Act of 1974,supra note 2, § 201(d)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (1976)).
47 Id. § 201(a)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2251(a)(1) (1976)).
48 The difficult task of counsel is to get the client to focus on the hard business facts and
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Ordinarily the first impulse of clients is to ask for quantitative re-
strictions that will resurrect the status quo ante with respect to the mar-
ket shares. However, in the presidental decision-making phase, the
statute requires that
[a]ny quantitative restriction proclaimed . . . and any orderly market-
ing agreement negotiated. . shall permit the importation of a quantity
or value of the article which is not less than the quantity or value of such
article imported into the United States during the most recent period
which the President determines is representative of imports of such
article.49
As has been pointed out above, the purpose of the statute is to pro-
vide temporary relief from excessive import competition in order to facil-
itate adjustment. In this sense, the Act provides a form of exceptional
relief from the effects expected (and desired) under a general statutory
scheme, as evidenced by the antitrust laws and general trade policies,
aimed at promoting freer competition. Because of these factors, the pro-
cess of choosing a remedy must begin with an economic assessment of
what realistically can be accomplished in the way of industry restructur-
ing over a period of five to eight years. How much can and must the
industry invest to become sufficiently competitive? What are the sources
of financing? Where in the industrial process can the greatest gains in
competitiveness be acquired and at what cost? What levels of protection
from import competition are necessary to allow the adjustment process to
take effect? What form should these restrictions take? What will be the
costs to society? The answers to such questions are the ingredients of the
decision-making process on choice of remedy, and the answers will differ
from case to case and among business enterprises in each case.
Economic consultants can provide the analytical skills necessary to
reach the business judgments. The practical question is how much to
spend on their services and when? For the ITC phase of the case a pres-
entation should be made outlining at least a preliminary proposal and its
rationale. This can be accomplished internally by each company, and
transmitted to the Commission in the form of confidential written sub-
missions. Legal or economic counsel should orally present a nonconfi-
dential summary for the industry as a whole during the hearing. As with
other aspects of the proceeding, counsel should endeavor to achieve a
high level of technical competence in the presentation and avoid self-
serving rhetoric.
H Considerations for the Respondents
Since escape clause proceedings involve an examination of the cu-
mulative effect of all imports of the like or directly competitive product,
the greatest difficulty for respondent's counsel is coordination of
the available courses that could reasonably be taken under varying competitive conditions rang-
ing from a quantitative roll back of imports to a limited increase in import duties charged.
49 19 U.S.C. § 2253(d)(2) (1976).
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presentations. Too often, individual importing companies try to proceed
independently and sometimes without the benefit of experienced counsel.
Especially in consumer product sectors an attempt is made by represent-
atives of an individual company to distinguish its imports as being totally
unique and therefore non-injurious. Such self-righteous and essentially
vain expressions are rarely helpful to the overall case, and in any event
are largely irrelevant. Moreover, the unguided novice, unfamiliar with
the technicalities of the statute and the niceties of proof and rebuttal,
usually will do more to prove the casefor statutory injury than the oppo-
site. As in most areas of the law, uninformed witnesses, motivated by
naive convictions as to the meaning of truth, justice, and equity, have
caused untold trouble through inadvertance.
For counsel to import interests, the first effort upon announcement
of a proceeding should be to arrange for ongoing consultation on tactics
and a regular exchange of intelligence among all respondents. Vanity
and jealousy will be the greatest bars to cohesion.
Counsel for a respondent has an especially difficult task in preparing
the case. First, the statute specifies a fixed time schedule which cannot
be enlarged. Second, in order to be completely prepared, counsel must
endeavor to learn the intricacies of the trade as well as a person in the
business with years of experience in its day to day operation. Counsel
should be wary of laymen who say they know everything there is to
know, yet interview every such source in order to develop an intimate
knowledge of products, companies, prices, personalities, and even rumor.
The most successful cases in response are those directed and produced by
attorneys who have done their homework in the two or three months
between announcement of a proceeding and the holding of hearings.
Each case under the escape clause is different. The guiding princi-
ple should be to demonstrate that none of the statutory requirements is
met. Accordingly, counsel should seek to demonstrate that imports are
not increasing, that statutory injury does not exist, and that in any event
imports are not the substantial cause. Product definition should be chal-
lenged at the outset whenever possible. Import and production data
should be examined over a period of more than five years, and trends
over shorter periods should be calculated. Counsel should bear in mind
that the statute speaks in terms of present injury, and historical trend
data only provide a framework for analysis.
Counsel for the respondent usually has his or her most difficult task
on the issue of injury. Actual information submitted to the ITC is always
held in confidence, and counsel must normally conduct an exhaustive
search for even approximations as to the health of the complaining in-
dustry; these are often based on little more than rumors in the trade.50
The available data on publicly held companies will generally be consoli-
50 Obviously, rumors will not be persuasive to commissioners possessing actual data.
However, one may find clues among the rumors as to how to structure a presentation so as to
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dated, although filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission
may provide information on relatively narrow lines of business that in-
clude the product under investigation.
A generally valuable source will be comments made by company
officials in the trade press. While such expressions admittedly involve a
good deal of "puffing" for the benefit of stockholders and bankers, they
often can be useful resources in the hands of a skillful attorney during
cross-examination of opposition witnesses.
For the most part, counsel will probably find to his chagrin that the
case to be made against a finding of injury will best be developed during
the course of the public hearings. While posthearing briefs afford an op-
portunity to clarify the case, counsel experienced in the more conven-
tional adversarial practice of the courtroom will find little comfort in the
knowledge that he may never know the economic facts upon which the
Commission has based its determination. One must, in the end, rely on
the integrity of the Commission and its staff as well as on the thorough-
ness of their efforts in collecting and analyzing data. It may be of some
comfort that the ITC is generally considered to be a jealous protector of
its reputation for thoroughness.5 1
Counsel for a respondent will generally find that the best case is
made on the issue of substantial cause. Product and marketing differ-
ences may well allow for development of arguments or proofs that im-
ports are not the substantial cause of statutory injury. Exercise of
oligopolistic power by some segments of the domestic industry to the det-
riment of others, or simply, competition among domestic entities alone,
may be the substantial cause of injury. Changes in consumer prefer-
ences, declines in other industries supplied by the complaining industry,
general recessionary conditions, or introduction of substitute products
are all possible causes of greater consequences than the imports against
which complaint is made. Once again, thoroughness of research and cre-
ativity in the development of arguments are the keys to success.
IV. The Presidential Determination
A. Preparing for the White House Review
Once the Commission has published a finding of statutory injury,
theatrics diminish in importance and hard-nosed political activity comes
to the fore.
Section 202(c) of the Act 52 requires that, in making his decision
whether to provide relief,
give cause to reexamine the actual data either in a different light or under different accounting
standards.
51 See GAO Report, supra note 11, for a somewhat contrary view.
52 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 2, § 202(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)
(1976)).
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the President shall take into account, in addition to such other consider-
ations as he may deem relevant-
(1) information and advice from the Secretary of Labor on the ex-
tent to which workers in the industry have applied for, are receiv-
ing, or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under chapter 2 or
benefits from other manpower programs;
(2) information and advice from the -Secretary of Commerce on the
extent to which firms in the industry have applied for, are receiving,
or are likely to receive adjustment assistance under chapters 3 and
4;
(3) the probable effectiveness of import relief as a means to pro-
mote adjustment, the efforts being made or to be implemented by
the industry concerned to adjust to import competition, and other
considerations relative to the position of the industry in the Nation's
economy;
(4) the effect of import relief on consumers (including the price and
availability of the imported article and the like or directly competi-
tive article produced in the United States) and on competition in
the domestic markets for such articles;
(5) the effect of import relief on the international economic inter-
ests of the United States;
(6) the impact on United States industries and firms as a conse-
quence of any possible modification of duties or other import re-
strictions which may result from international obligations with
respect to compensation;
(7) the geographic concentration of imported products marketed in
the United States;
(8) the extent to which the United States market is the focal point
for exports of such article by reason of restraints on exports of such
article to, or on imports of such article into, third country markets;
and
(9) the economic and social costs which would be incurred by tax-
payers, communities and workers, if import relief were or were not
provided.
Under section 242 of the Trade Agreements Act of 1962, 5 3 as most
recently implemented in Reorganization Plan Number 3 of 197954 and
Executive Order Number 12188 of January 2, 1980,5 5 the Congress and
the President have established an interagency committee structure to ad-
vise the President in escape clause determinations. The premise underly-
ing this interagency advisory structure is that the President should draw
upon the considerable talents and knowledge of the whole federal bu-
reaucracy in order that his decision be based upon a comprehensive con-
sideration of all factors pertinent to "the national economic interest."
Three principal committees perform the Executive Branch advisory
role.56 The Trade Policy Committee (TPC), chaired by the United
53 Trade Agreements Act of 1962, supra note 22, § 242.
54 Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1979, 3 C.F.R. 513 (1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 3396 and in 93 Stat. 1381.
55 Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R. 131 (1980).
56 The GAO Report, supra note 11, describes the structure and operations of these commit-
tees in considerable detail.
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States Trade Representative (USTR), is a cabinet level organization
which, in the context of escape clause proceedings, meets only infre-
quently to formulate trade policy recommendations. The TPC usually
becomes directly and actively involved in escape clause proceedings only
when foreign and domestic political considerations have been raised to
such a level that subcabinet officials or the professional trade staff bu-
reaucracy are unable to reach a consensus.
The second committee, the Trade Policy Review Group (TPRG), is
composed of subcabinet level officials who ordinarily deal with trade pol-
icy questions as a matter of day-to-day responsiblity. Implicit in the in-
teragency advisory committee structure is an assumption that the TPRG
will ordinarily be able to reach a concensus on policy recommendations.
The third committee, the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), is
the key group, at least in the early stages of policy formulation under the
escape clause. Membership on this committee parallels that of the TPC
and TPRG, and varies depending on the product (and parties) which
will be affected by the President's decision. As indicated by its title, the
TPSC is comprised of career staff people possessing expertise in the eco-
nomic and international political sectors involved in the case. The role
of the TPSC, in effect, is to reconsider the entire case including the ITC
report and its supporting files of investigative materials, as well as addi-
tional submissions made directly by interested parties.
Within a week or two after an affirmative ITC escape clause deci-
sion, the USTR will publish a notice in the Federal Register soliciting pub-
lic comment. This notice will ask that submissions concentrate on the
issues raised by section 202(c) of the Act. Prudent counsel on both sides
will have spent their time in the interim mustering political support on
Capitol Hill and wherever else it can be garnered.
Public relations consultants will have developed a campaign and be-
gun efforts to obtain media coverage and editorial discussion among the
influential press. The role of legal counsel will be to supply data and
insure accuracy in the written memoranda or fact sheets used by the
public relations advisors.
Legal counsel will also plan and execute the campaign to gain polit-
ical support by canvassing clients for contacts, preparing briefing papers,
and arranging for meetings and sponsorship of the cause among mem-
bers of the Congress, in state governments, among unions and allied in-
dustries, and through sympathetic trade associations.
The Federal Register notice from the USTR will establish deadlines
for the filing of comments. These should be met early and be followed
by briefings of cabinet and subcabinet officials holding memberships on
the Trade Policy Committee and Trade Policy Review Group. Contacts
with these officials are best arranged through the TPSC members as-
signed to the case, with some prompting from sympathetic members of
the Congress to guarantee attention at the highest level.
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Ongoing contact with these officials and their staffs should be main-
tained for purposes of both continuing the advocate's role and collecting
information on the decision-making process as it develops. It cannot be
overemphasized that close and continuing contact is essential if all argu-
ments are to be presented and all pressures brought to bear. The goal is
to prevail by sheer political clout.
On the respondent's side, an additional source of influence will be
found in Washington embassies of supplying countries as well as among
supplying companies abroad. The effort should be direct for the dura-
tion toward maximizing complaints from foreign governments directly to
the USTR and the State Department. Consideration should be given to
whether support can be obtained from U.S. companies in other indus-
tries which have facilities in the supplying countries or from U.S. banks
which are holding debt obligations from the supplying foreign states.
Every source of support, from consumer groups to longshoremen, cus-
toms brokers, and others in the distribution system should be pressured
to act.
On both sides of the battle, the keys to success will be organization,
close leadership control, and information; these are difficult to obtain
and use when only sixty days are available. Moreover, coordination
among groups actively working to head off restrictions is bound to be-
come increasingly difficult as individual interests privately begin to advo-
cate self-serving courses in the event restrictions are to be imposed. Some
may prefer higher import duties, rather than quantitative restrictions, so
that supplies will be restricted only by price elasticities. Others, usually
those with the greatest potential to corner the market, will begin to push
for quotas or tariff rate quotas as the preferred solution. Still others may
seek to have the President negotiate orderly marketing agreements with
the "real" problem makers who, not coincidently, happen to be the sup-
pliers in countries other than where these advocates have a stake.
While respondents at this stage most likely will be divided and con-
quered, they will enjoy certain advantages. Historically, the Executive
Branch has been philosophically predisposed to favor "free trade" over
"protectionism. '57 The Executive Branch also, as a rule, has given great
weight to protestations from abroad. Nevertheless, the final presidential
judgment, as pointed out earlier, will tend to be based primarily on the
perceived political risks, namely the likelihood of congressional override.
B. While House Review
The most nebulous aspect of an escape clause proceeding is the
White House phase. Every President has established within the Execu-
tive Offices his own procedures for internal review of interagency advice.
Each has established his own sense of priorities regarding trade issues,
57 See id. at 3.
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and some have taken an intense personal interest in reaching the deci-
sions called for by the statute. For counsel on both sides of these cases,
the ideal would be an opportunity personally to argue his or her case at a
private audience, but the ideal is rarely achieved.
The most practical approach is to adopt a strategy which maximizes
public and private clamor. The goal is to get the President's ear through
personal advisors at the highest level by obtaining expressions of support
across the broadest possible political and economic base.
It is in the nature of things political that influential committee
chairpersons in the Congress are high on the list of surrogate advocates.
Expressions of support from members of the Congress will be an impor-
tant element of the successful campaign, if only because the prospects of
a congressional override fight will give pause. Obtaining, early on, ex-
pressions of support from organized groups representing consumers, la-
bor, allied industries, and foreign interests will promote the cause both
within the White House and among members of the Congress represent-
ing constituencies where employment may or may not be directly af-
fected by the outcome of the case. Direct mail and telegrams from
affected workers and employers to the President will be of marginal value
in the ordinary case; a better result will be obtained if such correspon-
dence is sent to elected representatives in the Congress. Paid advertise-
ments in the print media are of questionable value.
V. Congressional Override
The Act provides that a presidential refusal to provide the import
relief recommended by the ITC, or a decision to provide relief in a differ-
ent form than that recommended, may be countermanded by the Con-
gress. 58 Specifically, the Act provides that the President must proclaim
the increased import restrictions recommended by the ITC if,59 "by an
affirmative vote of a majority of the members of each House present and
voting. . . " there is adopted a concurrent resolution disapproving his
initial decision. 6°
These provisions have never been tested to their fullest, although
there have been a very few cases where the congressional outcry has
forced some messy and hasty compromises. 6 1 As a practical matter, short
of a complete refusal to impose or arrange for some sort of real restraints
!on imports, it is unlikely that the Congress would override a President's
58 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 2, § 203(c) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)
(1976 & Supp. III 1979)).
59 Id. § 203(c)(1) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979)); see also Tax Reform
Act of 1976, note 26 supra.
60 Trade Act of 1974, supra note 2, § 203(c)(1) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
61 There is little on the public record regarding these cases, although the recent GAO
report touches on two. See GAO Report, supra note 11, at 30-3 1.
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decision under the escape clause. 62 To do so would put form ahead of
substance, and raise extraordinarily thorny constitutional questions
which neither the Congress nor the Executive would like to see settled in
the heat of an emotional debate conducted within ninety legislative days.
The import of these considerations for counsel representing a peti-
tioner is that political support must be garnered in sufficient volume to
make real the prospect of a tough congressional override fight should the
President refuse to proclaim significant import relief.
For counsel representing respondents, the objective is to acquire ex-
pressions of congressional support qualitatively and quantitatively supe-
rior to those obtained by the petitioners. Ordinarily this is a very
difficult task for the simple reason that foreign suppliers do not vote in
our congressional elections, whereas producers and workers in the af-
fected U.S. industry do. Moreover, in the normal case petitioners have
the easier job in forging alliances among other organized domestic inter-
est groups. Accordingly, counsel for respondents are well advised to be-
gin the search for political support at the outset of a proceeding. The
greater the degree of cohesion among import interests early on, the
higher the prospects for developing the necessary broad base of support.
Conversely, there is an increased risk that early political activity by re-
spondents may cause petitioners to exert efforts greater than would have
been the case if respondents moved to gain political support later in the
proceedings. The judgment to be made regarding when to initiate polit-
ical activity in any case will depend on an early appraisal of relative
political power, as well as a careful forecast of the likely political and
economic climate at the time the President's decision will have to be
made. In the latter aspect this effort is often a chancy exercise, but more
than one industry has won relief based on political campaign promises.
VI. Conclusion
Obtaining relief under the escape clause from excessive, "fair" im-
port competition requires that a solid factual case be made, within the
confines of the statute. Because the decision-making process is highly
politicized, even a "strong" factual case is no guarantee that relief will be
obtained. Before a petition is filed, counsel must thoroughly plan the
strategy to be followed over the ensuing eight to eleven months. Any
such plan must allow for considerable amendment as circumstances de-
velop. It must be clearly understood at the outset that the strategy
agreed to with clients must allow for prompt and pragmatic changes in
62 Admittedly, this is a personal view based on experiences in a number of cases. It is the
author's opinion that some form of import relief, which is not merely illusory, will pass congres-
sional muster. Even in the most controversial cases few members of the Congress will have (or
take) the time to consider every nuance of economic effect resulting from the provision of relief
in one form versus another. Moreover, the power of the Executive to protect its constitutional
prerogatives is considerable, and the chances of mustering sufficient congressional votes to ac-
complish override are slim.
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direction; the plan of action should never obscure the objective of ob-
taining meaningful relief.
For counsel to respondents, cohesion and coordination among all
groups are essential to success. However, time constraints are severe and
inflexible. Nevertheless, complete preparation by counsel is a necessity,
and a high degree of close client-attorney cooperation is critical if counsel
is to be effective.
On both sides, costs can reach astronomical levels. Clients must
make the business judgment regarding risks and benefits and what they
are worth in dollars. The lawyers must gear their efforts accordingly.
Both attorney and client must appreciate each other's difficulties, and
consider where costs can be pared. For instance, use of costly outside
consultants can be reduced substantially if in-house talent is available at
corporate headquarters. The client must understand, especially in the
second phase of escape clause proceedings, that enormous amounts of
time are required to keep abreast of developments, to coordinate re-
sources, and to present new arguments. The attorney must appreciate
that the client does not have a bottomless pocket, and judiciously use his
or her time to the greatest effect.
